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BOSTOCK V. LEXMARK: IS THE ZONE-OF-INTERESTS TEST A 
CANON OF DONUT HOLES? 
 Joseph S. Diedrich* 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision in Bostock v. Clayton County 
has understandably received considerable popular and scholarly attention, 
both for its substantive holding and for its opinions’ differing approaches to 
statutory interpretation. Writing for the majority, Justice Neil Gorsuch 
refused to allow extratextual considerations—such as assumptions about 
statutory purpose and expectations of bygone eras—to influence the 
interpretation of unambiguous text. And he implored judges to eschew 
related interpretive gestures—dubbed “canon[s] of donut holes”—that 
atextually limit the reach of statutory language.  
This Article argues that one such canon of donut holes is the “zone of 
interests” test, as articulated in Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control 
Components, Inc. Applicable to all statutory causes of action, the zone-of-
interests test invites reliance on extratextual considerations to limit a statute’s 
reach to only those plaintiffs within the “zone of interests” Congress 
supposedly meant to protect. The test clashes with the interpretive principles 
championed by the Bostock majority. Bostock, in fact, may also cast at least 
a shadow of doubt on other clear-statement rules, substantive canons, and 
judicial doctrines that limit the reach of statutory causes of action. This 
Article tentatively concludes that such rules, canons, and doctrines are in 
tension with now-prevailing notions of textualism and perhaps even the 
separation of powers. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Hailed as a civil-rights triumph, the blockbuster case of Bostock v. 
Clayton County, Ga.1 is also a study in statutory-interpretation 
methodology. Writing for the 6-3 majority, Justice Neil Gorsuch not only 
declared that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits an 
employer from “fir[ing] someone simply for being homosexual or 
transgender.”2 He also used the case’s platform to comprehensively 
explain his views on textualism. For Justice Gorsuch and the Bostock 
majority, “[o]nly the written word is the law” and “all persons are entitled 
to its benefit.”3 To that end, courts should disregard “extratextual 
 
 * Appellate Attorney, Husch Blackwell LLP, Madison, Wisconsin. J.D., University of 
Wisconsin, summa cum laude, Order of the Coif. All opinions are the author’s alone. 
 1. 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020). I co-authored an amicus curiae brief in support the employees in 
Bostock. 
 2. Id. at 1737. 
 3. Id.  
1
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consideration[s]”—including how the enacting Congress or enactment-
era public expected or assumed a statute would apply—that “add to, 
remodel, update, or detract from” statutory text itself.4 To that end, courts 
should reject “canon[s] of donut holes” that assume “Congress’s failure 
to speak directly to a specific case that falls within a more general 
statutory rule creates a tacit exception.”5  
Provoking two interpretation-focused dissents, Bostock reveals 
conflicts “within textualism.”6 This Article argues that Justice Gorsuch’s 
approach to textualism, as embraced by the majority, has implications 
well beyond Title VII. Specifically, Bostock’s directives to not “detract 
from” a text’s meaning and to avoid canons of donut holes call into 
question the judicially-created zone-of-interests test, as stated in Lexmark 
International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.7 Described in 
Lexmark as a “limitation,” the zone-of-interests test restricts every federal 
“statutory cause of action” to “only” those plaintiffs “‘whose interests fall 
within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked.’”8 Courts 
implementing that test often look beyond the text of (even unambiguous) 
statutes to extratextual considerations like purpose and “assum[ed]” 
intent.9 As a result, the test has the potential to deny a claim to plaintiffs 
who would otherwise come within the scope of a statute’s plain text. The 
zone-of-interests test, in short, is a “canon of donut holes.” In formulation 
and effect, it resembles aspects of the Bostock dissents and challenges the 
approach advocated by the majority. 
This Article proceeds in three main parts. Part II recounts Bostock in 
detail, focusing primarily on the majority’s and dissents’ differing 
approaches to statutory interpretation (and textualism in particular). Part 
III turns to Lexmark and the zone-of-interests test. Part IV discusses how 
the interpretive precepts championed by Justice Gorsuch in Bostock 
appear to be in tension with Lexmark and its ilk. Part IV further comments 
on some implications of that tension, including how the zone-of-interests 
test enables courts to deny the benefit of the law to historically unpopular 
individuals and minorities and may contribute to an already-acrimonious 
judicial selection process. Finally, this Article concludes with thoughts on 
how the Bostock–Lexmark tension relates to other judicial rules and 
doctrines of interpretation, as well as the separation of powers. The 
 
 4. Id. at 1737–38, 1749. 
 5. Id. at 1747.  
 6. Tara Leigh Grove, Which Textualism?, 134 HARV. L. REV. 265, 266 (2020) (emphasis 
removed). 
 7. 572 U.S. 118 (2014). 
 8. Id. at 129 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984)). 
 9. Id. at 130 (quoting Match–E–Be–Nash–She–Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. 
Patchak, 567 U.S. 209, 225 (2012)). 
2
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 89, Iss. 4 [2020], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol89/iss4/1
816 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 89 
 816 
upshot: Bostock’s textualism and the separation of powers offer reason to 
doubt the validity of many judicially-created limitations on legislatively-
created causes of action. 
II. BOSTOCK, TEXTUALISM, AND DONUT HOLES 
In Bostock v. Clayton County, the U.S. Supreme Court was asked 
whether Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits an employer 
from “fir[ing] someone simply for being homosexual or transgender.”10 
Writing for a 6-3 majority, Justice Gorsuch answered that question with 
a “yes.” The case comprised three consolidated disputes with roughly 
similar facts. In two of them, a gay male employee was fired shortly after 
his employer learned he was gay. In the third, a transgender female 
employee was fired after she informed her employer she would begin 
presenting as a female. As pleadings-stage cases, the question was 
whether these employees had stated a claim under Title VII,11 which 
makes it “unlawful . . . for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to 
discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any 
individual . . . because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin.”12  
The Court held that Title VII’s text led to an “ineluctabl[e]” 
conclusion.13 If an employer fires a gay man (a male attracted to males) 
but would not have fired a similarly situated straight woman (a female 
attracted to males), then that employer “discharge[s]” the “individual” 
“because of such individual’s sex.”14 The same logic applies to 
transgender employees.15 In short, “[a]n employer who fires an individual 
for being homosexual or transgender fires that person for traits or actions 
it would not have questioned in members of a different sex.”16 The 
employees in Bostock had all stated a claim under Title VII. 
For Justice Gorsuch, Bostock was about more than Title VII. His 
 
 10. 140 S. Ct. at 1737.  
 11. Id. at 1737–38, 1744. 
 12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1) (emphasis added). 
 13. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1750. 
 14. Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1).  
 15. If an employer fires a transgender woman (a male identifying as female) but would not have 
fired a similarly situated cisgender woman (a female identifying as female), then that employer has 
“discharge[d]” the “individual” “because of such individual’s” “sex.” (Although the phrase “male 
identifying as female” may not perfectly reflect contemporary medical or social understanding, this was 
the approach the Court took.) 
 16. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1737. In reaching his conclusion, Justice Gorsuch reasoned that “[i]t 
doesn’t matter if other factors besides the plaintiff’s sex”—such as sexual orientation—“contributed to 
the [employer’s] decision.” Id. at 1741. (Because of Title VII’s but-for causation standard.) Nor does it 
“matter if the employer treated women as a group the same when compared to men as a group.” Id. 
(Because of Title VII’s focus on individuals, not groups.) 
3
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majority opinion sets forth a specific, comprehensive approach to 
statutory interpretation. Building on recent opinions in Wisconsin 
Central, Ltd. v. United States17 and New Prime, Inc. v. Oliveria,18 Justice 
Gorsuch’s Bostock opinion describes and applies a semantics-centric 
textualism, anchored by original meaning, that consciously avoids 
limiting (or expanding) a statute’s textual reach based on how the text 
applies in a particular case. In Justice Gorsuch’s words, “every 
statute’s meaning is fixed at the time of enactment,” and that meaning 
cannot be “add[ed] to, remodel[ed], update[d], or detract[ed] from” based 
on “new applications may arise in light of changes in the world.”19 
Applied to the Bostock plaintiffs, this approach cares only that Title VII’s 
text encompasses their claims, regardless of whether Congress or the 
general public had foreseen such application of the law in 1964. 
Yet even if “we’re all textualists now,”20 Bostock brings into stark relief 
disagreements “within textualism.”21 Justice Samuel Alito dissented 
(joined by Justice Clarence Thomas), skewering the majority opinion as 
a “pirate ship” flying under a false textualist flag. For Justice Alito, the 
majority’s semantics-centric approach fails to appreciate how “[i]n 1964, 
ordinary Americans reading the text of Title VII would not have dreamed 
that discrimination because of sex meant discrimination because of sexual 
orientation, much less gender identity.”22 In 1964, after all, 
“homosexuality [was considered] a mental disorder, and homosexual 
conduct . . . [was considered] morally culpable and worthy of 
punishment.”23 Because “[t]he possibility that discrimination on either of 
these grounds might fit within some exotic understanding of sex 
discrimination would not have crossed their minds[,]” the statute should 
not be interpreted to cover such discrimination.24 In a separate dissent, 
Justice Brett Kavanaugh criticized the majority’s “literal” interpretation.25  
 
 17. 138 S. Ct. 2067 (2018). 
 18. 139 S. Ct. 532 (2019). 
 19. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1738; Wis. Central, 138 S. Ct. at 2074; see Katie R. Eyer, Statutory 
Originalism and LGBT Rights, 54 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 63, 93 (2019); see also ANTONIN SCALIA & 
BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW 101 (2012) (rejecting view that courts should “infer exceptions” to a 
statute’s plain meaning “for situations that the drafters never contemplated”). 
 20. Elena Kagan, The Scalia Lecture: A Dialogue with Justice Kagan on the Reading of Statutes, 
HARV. L. TODAY (Nov. 17, 2015) [http://perma.cc/3BCF-FEFR]. 
 21. Grove, supra note 6, at 266 (emphasis removed). 
 22. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1767 (Alito, J., dissenting); see also id. at 1755 (“If every single living 
American had been surveyed in 1964, it would have been hard to find any who thought that discrimination 
because of sex meant discrimination because of sexual orientation-not to mention gender identity, a 
concept that was essentially unknown at the time.”); id. at 1830 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“We cannot 
close our eyes to the indisputable fact that Congress-for several decades in a large number of statutes-has 
identified sex discrimination and sexual orientation discrimination as two distinct categories.”). 
 23. Id. at 1769 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 24. Id. 
 25. E.g., id. at 1824 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting); cf. id. at 1745 (majority opinion) (noting that the 
4
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In Justice Gorsuch’s view, the dissenters (and employers) were not 
arguing that “the statutory language bears some other meaning.”26 They 
were arguing, instead, that “few in 1964 expected today’s result.”27 Yet 
for Gorsuch, “contend[ing] that few in 1964 would have expected Title 
VII to apply to discrimination against homosexual and transgender 
persons” “abandon[s] the statutory text” and “appeal[s] to assumptions.”28 
This “logic impermissibly seeks to displace the plain meaning of the law 
in favor of something lying beyond it.”29 Justice Gorsuch’s textualism, 
then, firmly denounces consideration of either Congress’s or the public’s 
expected application of a law. It also rejects the notion that courts can 
limit a statute’s textual reach—either by precluding plaintiffs from 
bringing a cause of action or by shielding defendants from liability—
based on extratextual considerations. All this means that “Congress’s 
failure to speak directly to a specific case that falls within a more general 
statutory rule” does not “create[] a tacit exception”30—or, as Justice 
Gorsuch playfully put it, “there [is] [no] such thing as a canon of donut 
holes.” 
In one of the first scholarly treatments of Bostock, Tara Leigh Grove 
described Justice Gorsuch’s interpretive approach as a “formalistic 
textualism” that “instructs interpreters to carefully parse the statutory 
language, focusing on semantic context.”31 The Bostock dissenters, by 
contrast, relied on “flexible textualism,” a variant of textualism that 
“authorizes interpreters to make sense of the statutory language by 
looking at social and policy context, normative values, and the practical 
consequences of a decision.”32 By employing that flexible textualism, the 
Bostock dissenters were able to make what Andrew Koppelman calls 
“subtractive moves.” According to Koppelman, the dissenters’ approach:  
presume[es] that if a background belief was entrenched in the culture at the 
time of a law’s enactment, then one can rely on that background belief in 
order to subtract meaning from the plain language of a statute, to limit its 
extension in order to exclude applications that most people [including 
Congress] at the time would have rejected.33  
 
dissents “dismiss [the majority’s interpretation of Title VII] as wooden or literal”).  
 26. Id. at 1750. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 1749. 
 29. Id. at 1750. 
 30. Id. at 1747. “Instead, when Congress chooses not to include any exceptions to a broad rule, 
courts apply the broad rule.” Id. 
 31. Grove, supra note 6, at 267, 279. 
 32. Id. at 286. 
 33. Andrew Koppelman, Bostock, LGBT Discrimination, and the Subtractive Moves, 105 MINN. 
L. REV. HEADNOTES 1, 25 (2020). Among these subtractive moves are: interpreting a law to apply only 
to its “prototypical referent;” interpreting a law to only apply to “the categories of objects that it happens 
5
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Whether described as “flexible textualism” or in terms of “subtractive 
moves,” the Bostock dissenters’ interpretive approach implicitly relies on 
the “mischief rule,” which instructs the interpreter to “read a statute 
purposively, so that it applies only to the defect”—or “mischief”—“that 
the law aims to remedy.”34  
Whatever the merits of different forms of textualism or other 
interpretive approaches generally, Justice Gorsuch’s approach prevailed 
in Bostock. A six-member majority of the Court joined together to declare 
that “[w]hen the express terms of a statute give us one answer and 
extratextual considerations suggest another, it’s no contest. Only the 
written word is the law, and all persons are entitled to its benefit.”35 
III. LEXMARK AND THE ZONE-OF-INTERESTS TEST 
Six years before Bostock, Justice Antonin Scalia authored a unanimous 
opinion in Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, 
Inc.36 Lexmark sold printers and new toner cartridges. “Remanufacturers” 
purchased used Lexmark cartridges, refurbished them, and then sold them 
in competition with Lexmark’s new cartridges.37 To dampen this 
competition, Lexmark began installing microchips on certain cartridges 
that disabled the cartridge once it was used. Lexmark also offered a rebate 
to customers who returned used microchipped cartridges. Static Control 
developed and sold to remanufacturers microchips that “mimic[ked]” 
Lexmark’s.38 Lexmark sued Static Control for copyright infringement. 
Static Control counterclaimed for false advertising under the Lanham 
Act, which prohibits false advertising: 
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any 
container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or 
device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false 
or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of 
fact, which . . . in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the 
nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or 
another person’s goods, services, or commercial activities . . . shall be 
liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or is 
 
to bring to mind;” making “distinctions that feel familiar but which do not appear in the statute;” making 
exceptions based on the law’s “cultural background,” including by claiming that “the law, read in its 
cultural context, simply does not mean what it literally says.” Id. at 3. 
 34. Id. at 20–21 (citing Heydon’s Case, 3 Rep 7a, 76 ER 637 (1584)). On the history and uses of 
the rule, see generally Samuel Bray, The Mischief Rule, 109 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2021), available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3452037. 
 35. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1737.  
 36. 572 U.S. 118 (2014). 
 37. Id. at 121. 
 38. Id. at 118. 
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likely to be damaged by such act.39  
Static Control argued that Lexmark misled purchasers of microchipped 
cartridges to believe they were legally bound to return the cartridges to 
Lexmark, causing Static Control lost sales and reputational harm.40 The 
district court dismissed Static Control’s counterclaim on the grounds that 
Static Control lacked “prudential standing,” a protean doctrine enabling 
federal courts to “decline to adjudicate [a plaintiff’s] claim on grounds 
that are prudential, rather than constitutional.”41 That court concluded that 
Static Control’s injuries were too remote and that the remanufacturers 
themselves would serve as more direct plaintiffs.42 The case eventually 
rose to the Supreme Court, where it was litigated under the framework of 
prudential standing. 
The Court, however, held that the existing doctrine of prudential 
standing was too uncertain and gave courts unauthorized discretion to 
willy-nilly reject claims.43 At the same time, the Court preserved a 
component of the prudential-standing framework: the “zone of interests” 
test, which asks “whether a legislatively conferred cause of action 
encompasses a particular plaintiff’s claim.”44 According to Justice Scalia, 
this “modern” zone-of-interests test originated “as a limitation on the 
cause of action for judicial review conferred by the Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA).”45 Yet regardless of its origins, the test applies to 
all statutory claims, and “Congress is presumed to legislat[e] against the 
background of the zone-of-interests limitation . . . .”46  
To that end, the Court deployed the zone-of-interests test to determine 
“whether Static Control has a cause of action under the statute.”47 Because 
“a statutory cause of action extends only to plaintiffs whose interests fall 
within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked,”48 the test asks 
“whether Static Control falls within the class of plaintiffs whom Congress 
has authorized to sue under” the Lanham Act.49 Relying on an “[u]nusual, 
 
 39. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B). 
 40. Lexmark, 572 U.S. at 121–23. 
 41. Id. at 123–26. (All parties and the district court agreed that Static Control had Article III 
standing.) 
 42. Id. at 123. 
 43. Id. at 125–26. 
 44. Id. at 127, 129.  
 45. Id. at 129 (citing Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970)). 
But see Michael P. Healy, The Claims and Limits of Justice Scalia’s Textualism: Lessons from His 
Statutory Standing Decisions, 40 CARDOZO L. REV. 2861 (2019) (arguing that the zone-of-interests test 
was originally developed to expand—not limit—textual reach). 
 46. Lexmark, 572 U.S. at 129 (quoting Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 163 (1997)) (alteration in 
original). 
 47. Id. at 128. 
 48. Id. at 129 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984)). 
 49. Id. at 128. 
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and extraordinarily helpful” statement of purpose in the Lanham Act’s 
text, the Court reasoned that the Act’s false-advertising provision only 
encompasses claims by plaintiffs who “allege an injury to a commercial 
interest in reputation or sales.”50 Because Static Control had alleged such 
an injury, the Court held that it fell within the Lanham Act’s zone of 
interests—and therefore had stated a cause of action. 
Although the Lanham Act’s statement of purpose provided textual and 
contextual evidence for Lexmark’s holding, the opinion reveals that the 
zone-of-interests test need not be so textually grounded. For example, the 
Court noted how the Lanham Act authorizes suit by “any person who 
believes that he or she is likely to be damaged” by a defendant’s false 
advertising.51 “Read literally,” the Court conceded, “that broad language 
might suggest that an action is available to anyone who can satisfy the 
minimum requirements of Article III” standing.52 Yet, without 
explanation—and without connection to the Lanham Act’s statement of 
purpose—the Court pondered the “unlikelihood that Congress meant to 
allow all factually injured plaintiffs to recover persuades us that 
[§ 1125(a)] should not get such an expansive reading.”53 This statement 
(and others like it in the opinion) would apply to statutes even without an 
“[u]nusual, and extraordinarily helpful” statement of purpose.54 For those 
statutes, how do courts determine the “zone of interests protected by the 
law invoked”?55 Must they, too, ponder the likelihood or “unlikelihood” 
of what Congress “meant to allow”? 
Since Lexmark, the Supreme Court has applied the zone-of-interests 
test once more in 2017 in Bank of America Corp. v. City of Miami, Fla.56 
That case involved the federal Fair Housing Act (“FHA”), which forbids 
“discriminat[ing] against any person in the terms, conditions, or 
privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or 
facilities in connection therewith, because of race . . . .”57 The FHA also 
prohibits “any person or other entity whose business includes engaging in 
residential real estate-related transactions to discriminate against any 
person in making available such a transaction, or in the terms or 
conditions of such a transaction, because of race . . . .”58 A cause of action 
 
 50. Id. at 131–32 (quoting H.B. Halicki Prods. v. United Artists Commc’ns., Inc., 812 F.2d 1213, 
1214 (9th Cir. 1987)). 
 51. Id. at 129 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. (quoting Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 266 (1992)). 
 54. Id. at 131 (quoting H.B. Halicki, 812 F.2d at 1214). 
 55. Id. at 129 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984)). 
 56. 137 S. Ct. 1296 (2017). 
 57. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b). 
 58. Id. § 3605(a). 
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is available to any “aggrieved person,”59 which the FHA defines to 
include “any person who . . . claims to have been injured by a 
discriminatory housing practice.”60  
The City of Miami sued two banks, claiming they “intentionally issued 
riskier mortgages on less favorable terms to African–American and 
Latino customers than they issued to similarly situated white, non-Latino 
customers, in violation of §§ 3604(b) and 3605(a).”61 These 
discriminatory practices “disproportionately “cause[d] foreclosures and 
vacancies in minority communities in Miami,”62 which in turn harmed the 
City by decreasing property values, reducing tax revenues, and “forcing 
the City to spend more on municipal services” in blighted areas.63 The 
Court held that the City fell within the FHA’s zone of interests.64 Writing 
for a 5-3 majority on the issue, Justice Stephen Breyer relied primarily on 
precedent and did not engage extensively with the FHA’s text.65  
Justice Thomas wrote a dissent in part, joined by Justices Alito and 
Anthony Kennedy. Invoking Lexmark, Justice Thomas opined that the 
City’s “asserted injuries are ‘so marginally related to or inconsistent with 
the purposes’ of the FHA that they fall outside the zone of interests.”66 
Justice Thomas relied heavily on these “purposes,” reasoning that 
“[n]othing in the text of the FHA suggests that Congress was concerned 
about decreased property values, foreclosures, and urban blight, much 
less about strains on municipal budgets that might follow.”67 While “[a] 
budget-related injury might be necessary to establish a sufficiently 
concrete and particularized injury for purposes of Article III,” it “is not 
sufficient to satisfy the FHA’s zone-of-interests limitation.”68  
IV. BOSTOCK V. LEXMARK: TENSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
There are two possible ways to conceive of Lexmark’s zone-of-
interests test. The first possibility is that the test is redundant—or that 
there’s no “test” at all. Whether a plaintiff “has a cause of action under 
 
 59. Id. §§ 3613(a)(1)(A), 3613(c)(1). 
 60. Id. § 3602(i). 
 61. Bank of Am., 137 S. Ct. at 1300–01. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. The Court ultimately vacated and remanded for further consideration of proximate cause. 
 65. Whether or not further engagement was necessary is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 66. Id. at 1308 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Lexmark Int’l, Inc. 
v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 130 (2014)). 
 67. Id. at 1309 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The dissent did not point to 
any text suggesting that Congress wasn’t concerned about those issues. 
 68. Id. at 1310 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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the statute”69 is a workaday inquiry that courts routinely consider without 
ever uttering the phrase “zone of interests.” Per this conception, the test 
merely restates the inquiry under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and 
12 into whether the plaintiff has plausibly pleaded the elements of a 
particular claim.70 Indeed, it is difficult to envision how Lexmark’s 
outcome would have materially changed had nobody ever mentioned the 
Lanham Act’s “zone of interests.” Yet for all its intuitive appeal, this first 
conception is grossly unsatisfactory. Why would the Court maintain a 
separate zone-of-interests test if it were entirely redundant?  
The second possible conception is that the zone-of-interests test must 
do something (or at least must be capable of doing something in certain 
cases). After all, a unanimous Court in Lexmark endorsed the zone-of-
interests test qua test. Given Rule 8’s and Rule 12’s roles apart from the 
zone-of-interests test, the test could never function to expand a statutory 
cause of action. Instead, to the extent it makes a difference in a particular 
case, the test can only limit a statutory cause of action.  Lexmark, in fact, 
even referred to the test as the “zone-of-interests limitation.”71 At its most 
lenient in the Administrative Procedure Act context, the zone-of-interests 
test “forecloses suit only when a plaintiff’s interests are so marginally 
related to or inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the statute that it 
cannot reasonably be assumed that Congress authorized that plaintiff to 
sue.”72 Yet it still “forecloses suit” sometimes based on the statute’s 
“implicit purposes.” Because “the breadth of the zone of interests varies 
according to the provisions of law at issue,”73 all other statutory causes of 
action (besides the APA) are potentially limited more by the zone-of-
interests test. All told, this second conception is more plausible than the 
first. 
Proceeding under the second conception, Lexmark’s zone-of-interests 
test facilitates judicial limitation of statutory coverage, thereby 
necessarily butting heads with Bostock’s textualism in methodology and 
effect.74 The zone-of-interests test limits the scope of statutory causes of 
action “by ignoring clear statutory text”75 (in Michael Healy’s words) and 
by transparently considering—regardless of ambiguity—a statute’s 
 
 69. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118,128 (2014). 
 70. See generally, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
 71. Lexmark, 572 U.S. at 129 (emphasis added) 
 72. Id. at 131 (quoting Match–E–Be–Nash–She–Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. 
Patchak, 567 U.S. 209, 225 (2012)). 
 73. Id. at 130 (quoting Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 163 (1997)) 
 74. One could argue that such tension doesn’t actually exist: whereas the zone-of-interests test 
addresses whether a plaintiff can sue, Bostock addresses whether a defendant is liable. That argument is 
weak. Both Bostock and Lexmark purport to base their reasoning on generally applicable principles of 
textual interpretation. 
 75. Healy, supra note 45, at 2865 
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“purposes.”76 In Lexmark, Justice Scalia entertained “assum[ptions]” 
about whether “Congress authorized [a] plaintiff to sue”77 and pondered 
the “unlikelihood” that “Congress meant to allow all factually injured 
plaintiffs recover” under the Lanham Act.78 In tension with the Bostock 
majority, these statements call upon the same types of extratextual 
considerations the Bostock dissenters relied on and strongly resemble 
those dissenters’ “subtractive moves.” Fundamentally, Lexmark shares 
the Bostock dissenters’ implicit embrace of the “mischief rule,” which 
invites the interpreter “to read a statute purposively, so that it applies only 
to the defect that the law aims to remedy.”79 The zone-of-interests test, 
like the Bostock dissenters’ approach, excludes—or, at least, permits 
judges to exclude—“applications that most people [including Congress] 
at the time would have rejected.”80 The Bostock majority, by contrast, 
criticized those moves and that evidence as “abandon[ing] the statutory 
text” and “appeal[ing] to assumptions.”81 Whereas Bostock’s textualism 
would reject a limiting interpretation of a statutory cause of action 
because “few” people at the time of its enactment would “expect[] today’s 
result,”82 Lexmark’s zone-of-interests test not only provides cover for that 
reasoning, but arguably encourages it.  
The zone-of-interests test ultimately falls within Justice Gorsuch’s 
description of a “canon of donut holes.”83 Indeed, in many situations, the 
zone-of-interests test invites judges to assume that “Congress’s failure to 
speak directly to a specific case that falls within a more general statutory 
rule creates a tacit exception.”84 By considering the “interests” a statute 
“protects,” with reference to extratextual evidence of purpose, the test 
searches for affirmative evidence that Congress intended or expected a 
particular plaintiff or class of persons to have a claim under a statute, 
regardless of whether broad text facially provides one. Depending on the 
particular case, then, the test opens the door for judges to “add to, 
remodel, update, or detract from” textually apparent meaning and scope.85 
 
 76. Lexmark, 572 U.S. at 131 (quoting Match–E–Be–Nash–She–Wish, 567 U.S. at 225). 
 77. Id. at 130. 
 78. Id. at 129 (quoting Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 266 (1992)). 
These statements, Michael Healy has observed, “inquir[e] into” (or at least contemplate inquiry into) 
“Congress’s intent,” making them “curious” for a self-described textualist like Justice Scalia. Healy, supra 
note 45, at 2906.  
 79. Healy, supra note 45, at 20–21. 
 80. Id. at 25.  
 81. Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., Ga., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1749 (2020). 
 82. Id. at 1750. 
 83. One could simply stop the analysis here and say that Justice Gorsuch was wrong and that there 
is a canon of donut holes. Of course, implicit in Justice Gorsuch’s statement is that even if there is a canon 
of donut holes, there shouldn’t be one: proper statutory interpretation doesn’t include it among its ranks. 
 84. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1747. 
 85. Id. at 1738.  
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Bostock’s textualism, by contrast, eschews consideration of expected 
application, meaning that the statutory cause of action applies without 
judicial limitation: “when Congress chooses not to include any exceptions 
to a broad rule, courts apply the broad rule.”86 Under Bostock’s 
textualism, there is no room for a zone-of-interests test.  
The battle of “textualisms”87 between the Bostock majority and dissents 
goes beyond the legalistic. In this regard, because of the tension between 
the Bostock majority and Lexmark (and, transitively, the common ground 
between Lexmark and the Bostock dissents), what can be said about the 
Bostock dissents can also be said about Lexmark. Justice Gorsuch and 
commentators writing about his majority opinion have stressed why his 
approach deserves favor over the dissent. Lexmark’s and the Bostock 
dissents’ “flexible” textualism and “subtractive” qualities allow judges to 
“put the[ir] gut[s] in charge” and “restrict the operation of any statute, so 
that it has only the effects that were obvious at the time of enactment, 
rather than the effects dictated by the words of the law.”88 But in Justice 
Gorsuch’s view, this simply covers for “cynicism that Congress could not 
possibly have meant to protect” a particular person or class of people.89 
Interpreting a statute’s meaning based on such reasoning, he cautioned, 
“would tilt the scales of justice in favor of the strong or popular and 
neglect the promise that all persons are entitled to the benefit of the law’s 
terms.”90 For that reason, “formalistic” (or semantics-centric) textualism 
“may be valuable for politically vulnerable communities.”91 In addition, 
as Tara Leigh Grove has argued, the “formalistic” textualism embraced 
by Justice Gorsuch and the Bostock majority, as a comparatively “rule-
bound method,” has the potential to “better constrain. . . a judge’s 
proclivity to rule in favor of the wishes of the political faction that 
propelled her into power.”92 In other words, “[f]ormalistic textualism calls 
upon judges to limit their own discretion to rule consistently for their 
perceived ‘team’ in statutory cases.”93 This limited discretion, in turn, 
could have positive effects on the Court’s legitimacy and over time even 
help relax the current era’s rancorous Article II selection process.94 On 
 
 86. Id. at 1747. 
 87. Grove, supra note 6, at 267 (emphasis removed). 
 88. Koppelman, supra note 33, at 4, 38. 
 89. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1751; cf. Grove, supra note 6, at 266 n.10 (quoting NEIL GORSUCH, A 
REPUBLIC, IF YOU CAN KEEP IT 131, 144 (2019) (“[T]extualism helps ensure that all people, not just the 
popular or powerful, get the benefit of a law[.]”)).  
 90. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1751. “Only the written word is the law, and all persons are entitled to 
its benefit.” Id. at 1737. 
 91. Grove, supra note 6, at 274. 
 92. Id. at 269. 
 93. Id. at 304. 
 94. See id. at 296–307. 
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the flip side, then, perpetuating Lexmark’s zone-of-interests test—as well 
as any other rule, canon, or doctrine that permits comparatively easy 
injection of purpose and “gut” into statutory interpretation, thereby 
enabling judicial limitation of statutory language—risks undermining the 
Court’s legitimacy and further destabilizing the judicial nomination and 
confirmation process. 
Lest anyone think this Article overstates the potential of the zone-of-
interests test to deny “all persons” the “benefit” of the “written word,”95 
consider just a few recent circuit court decisions invoking the zone-of-
interests test. In Delta Const. Co. v. EPA,96 for example, the D.C. Circuit 
held that the plaintiffs fell outside the zone of interests protected by the 
Clean Air Act:  
Whenever Congress pursues some goal, it is inevitable that firms capable 
of advancing that goal may benefit. . . . But in the absence of either some 
explicit evidence of an intent to benefit such firms, or some reason to 
believe that such firms would be unusually suitable champions of 
Congress’s ultimate goals, no one would suppose them to [be within the 
zone of interests] to attack regulatory laxity.97 
Per this reasoning, even if a plaintiff is clearly within a statute’s textual 
scope, a court can nevertheless deem that plaintiff outside the statute’s 
primary purposes and put the burden on the plaintiff to provide “explicit 
evidence” of an “intent” to benefit it. Just like the Bostock dissents, then, 
Delta Construction “subtract[s] meaning from the plain language of a 
statute”98 and requires “explicit” extratextual evidence to bring a case 
back to where it started: within the bounds of a statute’s textual coverage.  
Similarly in In re Peeples,99 the Tenth Circuit invoked Lexmark to 
reject a plaintiff’s claim based on the Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay. 
Even though the relevant statute said that “an individual injured by any 
willful violation of a stay provided by this section shall recover actual 
damages,”100 the Court surmised that “Congress couldn’t possibly have 
intended for anyone who is marginally injured by an automatic-stay 
violation to sue for damages under § 362(k).”101 Quite transparently, this 
reasoning “abandon[s] the statutory text,” “appeal[s] to assumptions,”102 
and embraces the dubious mischief rule by “read[ing] [the] statute 
 
 95. Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., Ga., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1737 (2020).  
 96. 783 F.3d 1291 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (per curiam). 
 97. Id. (quoting Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. EPA, 861 F.2d 277, 283 (D.C. Cir. 
1988)). 
 98. Koppelman, supra note 33, at 25.  
 99. 880 F.3d 1207 (10th Cir. 2018). 
 100. 5 U.S.C. § 362(k) (emphasis added) 
 101. Peeples, 880 F.3d at 1216 (emphasis added). 
 102. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1749. 
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purposively, so that it applies only to the defect that the law aims to 
remedy.”103 It uses the exact same couldn’t-possibly-have-meant-it 
speculation that Justice Gorsuch expressly chided as threatening to “tilt 
the scales of justice in favor of the strong or popular and neglect the 
promise that all persons are entitled to the benefit of the law’s terms.”104  
Finally, in Stockbridge-Munsee Cmty. v. Wisconsin,105 the Seventh 
Circuit (arguably in dicta) considered the zone of interests protected by 
the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. Despite statutory language that 
facially gives tribes an unqualified cause of action to sue for a violation 
of the Act, the court observed that “none of the Act’s substantive rules 
seems to protect one tribe from competition by another.”106 It therefore 
would have held that the zone-of-interests test precludes claims by a tribe 
against another tribe (as opposed to a state).107 Contrary to Bostock, the 
courts in all three of these cases privileged “extratextual considerations” 
over text, “detract[ed] from” a statute’s meaning, and thereby denied 
some persons the benefit of written law.108 
To be sure, there are certainly grounds on which to push back against 
this Part’s argument thus far. One might wonder, for instance, whether it 
is fair to compare Bostock with Lexmark at all. Lexmark and the zone-of-
interests test are used to interpret statutory provisions creating a cause of 
action. Bostock, on the other hand, interpreted a statutory provision setting 
forth a liability rule.109 Still, so what? By Lexmark’s own terms, the zone-
of-interests test is about “straightforward” “statutory interpretation.”110 If 
the topic of discussion is statutory interpretation, then making sense of 
different cases’ statutory-interpretation approaches is fair game. From 
there, especially for self-proclaimed textualists, what basis exists to apply 
different approaches to different types of statutory text when they are 
fundamentally all statutory text?111  
Justice Scalia also arguably justified the zone-of-interests test in a way 
that preempts or resolves the tension described in this Part. He defended 
 
 103. Koppelman, supra note 33, at 20–21.  
 104. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1751. 
 105. 922 F.3d 818 (7th Cir. 2019). I was among multiple counsel representing one of the parties in 
the case. 
 106. Id. at 821 (emphasis added). 
 107. Id. at 823. 
 108. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1737. 
 109. Even this distinction rests on shaky foundation. How does a judge really know when to use 
the zone-of-interests test? Can’t any liability rule be reframed as a question about the type of plaintiff that 
can sue?  
 110. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118,129 (2014).. 
 111. If the zone-of-interests test is so susceptible to purposive influence, then what explains self-
proclaimed textualists’ (like Justice Scalia in Lexmark and Justice Thomas in Bank of America) 
enthusiastic support of it? Especially outside the APA context, is it just a way for textualists to obscure 
their own departures from textualism? 
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the zone-of-interests test as a “requirement of general application” that 
Congress “legislat[es] against the background of” and that “applies unless 
it is expressly negated.”112 Nearly identical language is often used to 
describe other clear-statement rules and substantive canons.113 But there 
are several problems with this defense. To begin, the validity of such rules 
and canons has been questioned, especially when they are used in a way 
other than to break a tie between two equally plausible interpretations of 
statutory text.114 Moreover, if the modern zone-of-interests test was 
created in 1971,115 how could earlier Congresses—such as the one that 
enacted the Lanham Act or the one that enacted Title VII—have legislated 
against its background?116 Finally, other clear-statement rules and 
substantive canons are applied without regard to the purpose or intent of 
the particular statute at issue. As an example, Congress is presumed to 
enact statutes of limitation with the understanding that they are subject to 
equitable tolling.117 But courts apply equitable tolling irrespective of the 
intent, purpose, or expected application of a particular statute. The zone-
of-interests test, by contrast, limits a statute’s reach based on that statute’s 
purpose (and, potentially, its intent and expected application). How can 
Congress legislate against the background of the zone-of-interests test if 
the test itself depends on the particular statute?118 For Congress to 
legislate against a background rule, the content of that background rule 
must be ascertainable by Congress ahead of time. In sum, the background 
justification is unsatisfactory for allowing the zone-of-interests test to 
overcome statutory language. 
Finally, this Article’s observations likely extent beyond Lexmark’s 
zone-of-interests test. The tension between Bostock and the zone-of-
interests test suggests that Bostock’s textualism may denounce any 
 
 112. Lexmark, 572 U.S. at 129 (quoting Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 163 (1997)). 
 113. See generally Amy Coney Barrett, Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency, 90 B.U. L. REV. 
109 (2010). 
 114. See generally id. Justice Gorsuch left room for extratextual considerations – such as legislative 
history – to resolve ambiguity. See Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., Ga., 140 S. Ct. 1731,1749 (2020). The zone-
of-interests test, by contrast, invites extratextual considerations regardless of ambiguity. 
 115. Lexmark, 572 U.S. at 130 n.5. 
 116. Justice Scalia attempted to address that question by citing the common law: “Although we 
announced the modern zone-of-interests test in 1971, its roots lie in the common-law rule that a plaintiff 
may not recover under the law of negligence for injuries caused by violation of a statute unless the statute 
is interpreted as designed to protect the class of persons in which the plaintiff is included, against the risk 
of the type of harm which has in fact occurred as a result of its violation.” Id. (quoting W. KEETON, D. 
DOBBS, R. KEETON, & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON LAW OF TORTS § 36, pp. 229–30 (5th ed. 
1984)). Even if that explanation could justify a pre-1971 background principle, however, it is difficult to 
envision how it extends to statutory causes of action that bear little resemblance to common-law tort 
claims. 
 117. Barrett, supra note 113, at 123 n.65. 
 118. “[T]he breadth of the zone of interests varies according to the provisions of law at issue . . . .” 
Lexmark, 572 U.S. at 130 (quoting Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 163 (1997)). 
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judicial limitation on a statutory cause of action. Bostock’s 
methodological themes of respecting semantic meaning, eschewing 
expected application, and rejecting canons of donut holes also call into 
question other clear-statement rules, substantive canons, and judicial 
doctrines that limit what statutes say.119 Crucially, not only does judicial 
limitation of statutory language contradict textualist principles, but it also 
undermines constitutional order. Under the U.S. Constitution (and 
similarly under state constitutions), Congress is vested with the 
“legislative Power,” and courts are vested with the “judicial Power.”120 
Judicial power consists of applying law to adjudicate particular disputes, 
interpreting that law in the course of applying it, and (if multiple 
applicable sources of law conflict) deciding in accord with higher-order 
law.121 When the law supplying a rule of decision is statutory, and there 
is no question of the statute’s constitutionality, courts exceed their 
constitutionally vested power if, in the course of adjudicating a dispute, 
they interfere with or exercise legislative power. In short, courts interpret 
and apply law; they cannot “add to, remodel, update, or detract from” 
statutory law.122 Doing so “would risk amending statutes outside the 
legislative process reserved for the people’s representatives.”123 
Bostock thus brings to the surface a quandary that has always lurked 
just beneath: judicially-created limitations on legislatively-created causes 
of action may violate the separation of powers, at least in certain 
circumstances. Many state courts, for example, have adopted some 
version of the common-law economic-loss doctrine, which holds that 
“there is no liability in tort for economic loss caused by negligence in the 
performance or negotiation of a contract between the parties.”124 
Although the economic-loss doctrine originated as a judicial limitation on 
common-law tort claims, some courts have applied the doctrine to 
 
 119. Grove, supra note 6, at 286–87; see, e.g., Anita S. Krishnakumar, Reconsidering Substantive 
Canons, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 825, 835 (2017) (noting the “significant theoretical tension between 
substantive canons and textualism”); John F. Manning, Clear Statement Rules and the Constitution, 110 
COLUM. L. REV. 399, 403–06 (2010); Barrett, supra note 113; John F. Manning, Absurdity Doctrine, 116 
HAR. L. REV. 2387 (2003). ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 28 (Amy Gutmann ed., 
1997) (“To the honest textualist, all of these preferential rules and presumptions are a lot of trouble . . . . 
[I]t is virtually impossible to expect uniformity and objectivity [from an interpretive method] when there 
is added . . . a thumb of indeterminate weight.”). But see, e.g., SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 19, at 247–
339 (endorsing certain of these canons and rules). 
 120. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1; id. art. III, § 1. 
 121. See Joseph S. Diedrich, Separation, Supremacy, and the Unconstitutional Rational Basis Test, 
66 VILLANOVA L. REV. (forthcoming 2021), available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3696681. See generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 
(1 Cranch) 137 (1803); PHILIP HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY (2008). 
 122. Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., Ga., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1738 (2020). 
 123. Id.  
 124. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR ECON. HARM § 3 (2020). 
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preclude statutory causes of action.125 Many other courts, however, have 
held that the doctrine cannot be deployed to bar a legislatively-created 
cause of action or remedy.126 And some have done so by explicitly 
invoking the respective state’s separation of powers.127 Recently in 
Colorado, for example, a trial court found an individual liable both for 
breach of contract and for violation of Colorado’s civil-theft statute.128 On 
appeal, the defendant argued, under the economic-loss doctrine, that the 
plaintiff’s “remedies were limited to those for breach of contract, and that 
Colorado’s economic loss rule bars [the plaintiff’s] claim for civil 
theft.”129 The Colorado Supreme Court rejected the argument, holding 
that “the judge-made economic loss rule cannot bar a statutory cause of 
action.”130 “[T]o limit or abrogate a clear legislative pronouncement by 
reason of such judicial policy concerns would offend the separation of 
powers.”131  
The Colorado Supreme Court’s reasoning may extend to other 
interactions between judicial doctrines and statutory causes of action. For 
instance, depending on the statutory cause of action at issue, might the 
exhaustion-of-remedies doctrine or primary-jurisdiction doctrine 
encroach on legislative power by atextually limiting the statute’s 
 
 125. See, e.g., Dillon v. Leazer Grp., Inc., 374 F. Supp. 3d 547, 558 (E.D.N.C. 2019) (holding that 
economic-loss doctrine barred claims under North Carolina’s Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act); 
Ridolfi v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 146 F. Supp. 3d 619, 626 (M.D. Pa. 2015) (holding that 
economic-loss doctrine barred claims under the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer 
Protection Law); MBI Acquisition Partners, L.P. v. Chronicle Publ’g Co., 301 F. Supp. 2d 873, 886 (W.D. 
Wis. 2002) (holding that economic-loss doctrine barred claim under Wisconsin’s Deceptive Trade 
Practices Act). 
 126. Shaw v. CTVT Motors, Inc., 300 P.3d 907, 909–10 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013), as amended (Mar. 
29, 2013) (and listing other states and cases); Hinrichs v. DOW Chem. Co., 937 N.W.2d 37, 50 (Wis. 
2020) (holding that economic-loss doctrine did not bar claim under Wisconsin’s Deceptive Trade 
Practices Act, because the claim was statutory). 
 127. See, e.g., Bermel v. BlueRadios, Inc., 440 P.3d 1150, 1153 (Co. 2019); Ulbrich v. Groth, 78 
A.3d 76, 102 (Conn. 2013) (and listing other states and cases); Stallings v. Kennedy Elec., Inc., 710 So. 
2d 195, 196 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998), approved sub nom. Comptech Int’l, Inc. v. Milam Commerce Park, 
Ltd., 753 So. 2d 1219 (Fla. 1999) (quoting Delgado v. J.W. Courtesy Pontiac GMC–Truck, Inc., 693 So. 
2d 602, 609 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)) (emphasis removed) (first alteration in original) (“[C]ourts do not 
have the right to limit and, in essence, to abrogate . . . the expanded remedies granted . . . under [a] 
legislatively created scheme by allowing the judicially favored economic loss rule to override a legislative 
policy pronouncement and to eliminate the enforcement of those remedies. In sum, any tension between 
the legislative policy embodied in the [statutory cause of actin] and the judicial policy embodied in the 
economic loss rule must be resolved under the doctrine of separation of powers in favor of the legislative 
will so long as the [statute] passes constitutional scrutiny.”); Eastwood v. Horse Harbor Found., Inc., 241 
P.3d 1256, 1268–69 (Wash. 2010) (Madsen, C.J., concurring) (“[W]e cannot apply the common law 
economic loss rule to nullify the statutory cause of action for waste without violating separation of powers 
principles and encroaching on the legislature’s authority to establish a cause of action.”). 
 128. Bermel, 440 P.3d at 1151–52. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id.  
 131. Id. at 1157. 
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scope?132 Or how about qualified immunity, when used to limit a 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 action to only those plaintiffs who can show their violated 
constitutional rights were clearly established?133 At minimum, any 
judicially-created limitation on the textually-ascertainable scope of a 
legislatively-created cause of action should be carefully scrutinized for 
compliance with the separation of powers.  
V. CONCLUSION 
Bostock has drawn attention to different approaches to statutory 
interpretation and has highlighted conflicts “within textualism.”134 
Rejected by Justice Gorsuch and the Bostock majority, the Bostock 
dissenters’ flexible textualism entertains extratextual considerations and 
resembles Lexmark’s zone-of-interests test. Indeed, the zone-of-interests 
test constitutes a “canon of donut holes” that invites courts to “detract 
from” statutory text and deny to some plaintiffs the “benefit” of “written 
. . . law.”135 The test may thus be susceptible to challenge (or, at least, 
may be at risk of gradual “zombif[ication]”).136 Interpretation principles 
underlying Justice Gorsuch’s Bostock majority, moreover, cast doubt on 
other judicially-created canons, rules, and doctrines. To the extent a 
canon, rule, or doctrine limits the reach of legislatively-created causes of 
action, the separation of powers will have in Bostock a strong ally going 
forward.  
 
 132. Indeed, “where a cause of action,” such as a declaratory-judgment claim under certain statutes, 
“already has arisen, the exhaustion [doctrine] amounts to little more than the exhaustion of plaintiffs by 
denying them access to the courts and the equal protection of the law.” PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 304 (2014) (emphasis added). 
 133. See generally, e.g., William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106 CAL. L. REV. 45 
(2018). 
 134. Grove, supra note 6, at 266 (emphasis removed). 
 135. Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., Ga., 140 S. Ct. 1738, 1747 (2020). 
 136. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2425 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment). The 
answer may depend, at least in part, on respective Justices’ views about methodological stare decisis. 
Assuming the zone-of-interests test exists among clear-statement rules and substantive canons, what, if 
any, precedential respect is owed to such tests and rules? For present purposes, it suffices to say that 
descriptively and normatively, the answer is unclear. See, e.g., Evan J. Criddle & Glen Staszewski, Against 
Methodological Stare Decisis, 102 GEO. L.J. 1573, 1576–77 (2014) (“Despite widespread support for the 
doctrine of stare decisis on substantive statutory issues, federal courts generally do not give stare decisis 
effect to their methodological decisions in statutory interpretation cases.”); Abbe R. Gluck, The States as 
Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 
119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1823, 1848 (2010) (observing that “judges can and do bind other judges’ 
methodological choices, in the same way they bind one another with respect to substantive precedents,” 
and arguing that “settling on a consistent approach is a worthy goal for statutory interpreters”) (emphasis 
removed). See generally Sydney Foster, Should Courts Give Stare Decisis Effect to Statutory 
Interpretation Methodology?, 96 GEO. L.J. 1863 (2008). 
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